CULTURAL CHANGE: PARTICIPATION OF TRADITIONAL RESERVISTS IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPON PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM (PRP)
regulations and directives were changed to exclude them. Over time, the cultural aspect of exclusion has become so embedded within the organization that much of it is second nature and often taken for
granted.
An organization that has a well-established history also has a mature, well-developed organizational culture, often referred to as Strategic Culture. In large complex organizations like the Air
Force, there will be many different subordinate organizations that have developed their own organizational subcultures. For example, the cultures of the Air Force's fighter, bomber, and transport communities, special operations forces, civilians, and Reserve components all differ somewhat, but they embody the same basic values and beliefs of the total Air Force's culture. Subcultures developed within these formal or informal groups, like those in the various components, branches, and functional areas, must express and share the core Air Force organizational culture. A major challenge of strategic leadership, therefore, is to ensure that all these subcultures are compatible with the desired core culture. and what is actually happening within the organization. This is the experience-based validation process.
A problem occurs when the institutional value of individual responsibility, the stated value of empowering leaders at all levels to execute their responsibilities, and the operating values are in conflict. The anticipated result might be the suppression of individual initiative, innovation, adaptation, and resourcefulness, and the development of easily frightened military leadership.
institutional values, stated values, and operating values should reflect the same underlying beliefs and assumptions. The greater the difference, the greater the degree of distrust and loss of confidence between the leadership and the led. This, in turn, results in a decrease of organizational effectiveness.
Carried to extreme, the differences could negatively affect the public's trust in the organization.
Therefore, building and sustaining a culture based on trust and confidence, vertically and horizontally, is a key responsibility of strategic leadership. Strategic leaders must ensure institutional and stated values are consistent with the values of both the larger society and the needs of the organization. They must also ensure through policy, doctrine, regulations, and implementing procedures that they produce the 7 desired results.
Over time, the culture becomes so embedded within the organization that much of it is second nature and often taken for granted. what the organization deems as important. The full spectrum of activities associated with the routine of running the Air Force is continually evaluated for its relative importance, as indicated by how well they are resourced. People are more attentive to those programs or policies that they perceive to be higher in priority by virtue of those programs or policies receiving a greater share of resources.
The structure of the organization also changes or sustains the culture. How the organization is structured has a significant effect on its culture and its capability to express the vision. For example, multi-layered organizations tend toward more bureaucracy, less flexibility and innovation, and more cumbersome communications than those with fewer layers. Decision-making authority tends to be retained at higher levels, and empowerment downward becomes more difficult. If more empowerment and greater freedom of action are necessary in achieving the organization's vision, then the strategic leader should design structures and processes to reflect this. The strategies designed to achieve the Changing organizational culture is difficult but not impossible. In fact, cultural change is imperative if an organization is to grow, develop, and adapt to the changing environment within which it exists.
However, it takes time to change an organization's culture, usually between five and ten years, so the strategic leadership of an organization must have patience to see change through.
The cultural changes connected with developments evolved over long periods, several years in The Air Force reflects the vision of our forefathers and their culture, which was validated through experience and articulated in the Constitution and it Amendments. Changing organizational culture is difficult but not impossible, however, it does take time.
SHAPING CULTURE
According to Dr. Magee, the strategic leader must take steps to shape the organization's culture in a manner that supports and helps to communicate the vision. Tasks within this area include:
1. Ensuring that organizational culture is built on values deemed essential by the strategic leadership.
2. Ensuring that stated values, as related to the strategic vision, are communicated throughout the organization and are internalized by it members.
3. Building consensus with the organization to gain support for goals and objectives that support and implement the vision.
4. Initiating structural changes and programs with distant completion dates that must be institutional to be achieved.
5. Ensuring an organizational commitment to train other leaders by picking the right people for the right jobs.
6. Ensuring the reward structure reinforces the values and behaviors you desire.
THE LEADER AS A CHANGE AGENT
Unfortunately, as the rate of change in the technological, economic, political, and socio-cultural environment increases, the very strengths that were institutionalized can become liabilities. Leaders now have to begin to think like change agents, because the problem is not only how to acquire new concepts and skills, but also how to unlearn things that are no longer serving the organization well. With the continuing reduction of active duty forces, Reservists must now assume some of their missions. 18 Leaders who find themselves in a mature organization that has developed dysfunctional processes, and who therefore must think of themselves, as agents of change, need two particular characteristics.
First, they have to have the emotional strength to be supportive of the organization while it deals with the anxieties attendant upon unlearning processes that were previously successful, that is, the ability to create for the organization a sense of "psychological safety." And second, they need a true understanding of cultural dynamics and the properties of their own organizational culture. 1 The critical aspect to understand about cultural dynamics is that leaders cannot arbitrarily change culture in the sense of eliminating dysfunctional elements, but they can evolve culture by building on its includes RC participation in special missions and access to some of our most sophisticated and highly guarded systems. These same systems and missions are often managed under PRP. We cannot afford formal policy statements that defeat reserve integration at the most fundamental level. As stewards of the Total Force and prudent managers, we need to ensure that commanders have access to both active and RC personnel in meeting manpower requirements." 21 It is important to understand the criticality and seriousness of PRP by studying its history, strengths, and weaknesses.
THE HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM (PRP)
The need for a personnel reliability program became apparent in 1959 when an American active duty sergeant stationed at the Royal Air Force Base in Sculthorpe, England, held the base hostage by placing a .45-caliber pistol to the warhead of a nuclear bomb. After six hours, the sergeant surrendered.
It was soon learned that he was being treated for serious depression and that his psychiatrist had not known that the man worked directly with nuclear weapons. Eli Flyer, then a personnel researcher recalls that in the aftermath of the incident there was some dispute within the Pentagon about what would have happened if the sergeant had in fact fired his weapon. At a minimum, it was concluded, the impact of the bullet would likely have detonated the high explosives contained in the bomb and thus scattered nuclear debris into the atmosphere. But even disclosure of the incident-which was hushed up by the military and not reported until 1962-would have been a public relations disaster. At that very time, Air Force officials had been assuring the public that U.S. military personnel were rigorously screened to ensure that none would intentionally provoke a nuclear disaster. "Disclosure of the event would certainly have knocked us out of England," said Flyer, and England was the keystone to the U.S. nuclear strategy in Europe. 22 Responding to the near disaster at Sculthorpe, in 1962, the Air Force developed a system to screen candidates for nuclear-sensitive jobs that was quickly enacted by the Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command, General Curtis E. Lemay. By 1965, a version of this system had been adopted service-wide and called the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). It is supposed to guarantee that only "competent, stable, and dependable individuals" have access to America's nuclear arsenal. Since PRP was implemented, no nuclear accidents can be directly traced to mentally unreliable personnel, however, there are numerous cases of decidedly unreliable active duty service members receiving PRP clearances. In the last 11 years, three different men who were approved to work with nuclear weapons were convicted of committing murders that occurred while they were on active duty. Of course, any program responsible for screening tens of thousands of applicants is likely to make mistakes in at least a handful of cases. In one case, the Navy granted PRP clearance to a man whom it knew to have been a suspect in an unsolved murder, and who was caught in a multitude of lies during his screening. Three years later, in 1989, the man, a fire control technician on the USS Alaska nuclear submarine, brutally murdered an elderly couple. At the time of his arrest, he claims he had the knowledge to override the controls on the Alaska and launch a nuclear attack. Weapons designers have gone to great lengths since the Sculthorpe affair to ensure that no individual is able to single-handedly set off a nuclear weapon.
23
However, there is a possibility that such a disaster remains.
PRP is a two-step process that includes an initial screening and post approval monitoring. Military investigators look for a variety of traits, including "good social adjustment," "emotional stability," and a "positive attitude toward nuclear weapons duty." If problems emerge on the job, individuals can be temporarily or permanently barred from duties that require PRP clearance. About 7,000 people were decertified between 1990 and 1996. The Pentagon's annual status report on PRP for 1996 shows that 758 personnel were kicked out of the program that year. Of those, 169 were expelled due to "conviction by a military or a civilian court of a serious offense" or" a pattern of behavior indicative of a contemptuous attitude toward the law or other duly constituted authority". The number of armed forces personnel with PRP certification has dropped from an average of about 100,000 during the 1980s, when the Cold War was still raging, to just 19,042 by 1996. During the initial screening, PRP candidates undergo a medical evaluation and are interviewed by certifying officials. The candidate's personnel file is reviewed, and military investigators conduct a background check to examine professional, educational, and personal histories. As part of this process, investigators may interview family, friends and neighbors, and former employers and colleagues. Critics of the screening say it includes no routine psychological testing and that a candidate's entire medical evaluation may be limited to an examination of old medical records. 24 A review of dozens of files of active duty people who were decertified from PRP during the early 1990s, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, also calls into question the "stable and dependable" nature of PRP personnel. One person was kicked our after being "overcome by a severe emotional disturbance which caused him to lose his ability to communicate.... He was subsequently diagnosed with having a personality disorder which is a deeply ingrained, maladaptive pattern of behavior." Another was decertified after "an alcohol-related incident at a local bar where he allegedly assaulted a civilian, who was hospitalized with severe head injuries." A third case involved a soldier who tried to suffocate his 12-day-old daughter when she wouldn't stop crying. Other PRP-approved personnel tried to commit suicide or were found guilty of crimes ranging from rape to burglary; one man was found drunk while on duty with a bottle of Jack Daniels concealed in his waistband. The system is not foolproof; and access to some of our most sophisticated and highly systems. These same systems and missions are often managed under PRP. We cannot afford formal policy statements that defeat reserve integration at the most fundamental level. This is a directive that involves all the Services; the Navy's specific position has been that the directive needs to have specific guidance for the Reserves in orderte ensure consistency among the Services.
The Air Force position has been that accountability for the Reservists will be in the AFIs and that the longoverdue directive needs to be published as soon as possible. After a long recess over the holidays, the DoD PRP working group met on 23 February 2000. The deliverable by this working group was to make changes to the Directive that incorporates Reserves and provides sufficient guidance without lowering the current standards while maintaining the overarching goal of ensuring the nuclear devices are safe and secure. The real crux of the wording problem was the frequency of contact for "continuing evaluation"
and "peer reporting". The group sought to establish a minimum number of days between observations and frequency of contact rather than establishing a minimum number of days for reserve duty.
Continuing evaluation is defined in the present DoDD 5210.42 as "observed for compliance with reliability standards...duty performance and on and off-duty behavior and reliability on a consistent and frequent basis". 39 Under the current 5210.42, no time period is applied to the concept of continuing evaluation.
The Group felt that, in order to keep an equivalent standard, there was a need to define "continuing evaluation" in terms of both active and reserve participation in PRP while keeping in mind that.DoD policy should not exclude/prohibit but to support the CINCs and individual commanders.
The PRP working group met the following day to continue the discussion which centered around the concept of continuing evaluation and the commander who always has the ability to certify or notthere has to be a comfort level on their part. From a peer reporting perspective, a commander has to accept a certain amount of risk given a solid review of past performance reviews; the onus is on the commander to know people. It was decided that 4 service days per month with a maximum interval of 12 days between contact periods met the theme of the concept of continuing evaluation. The 12-day concept is more stringent than that required for active duty (30 days), however, peers see the active duty person the other 11 months. It was decided that commanders need the opportunity for information access through contacts with employers and civil law enforcement, credit checks, random polygraphs, and drug testing every duty period. The group based all this discussion on access to information upon which to base the decision -behavioral, medical, and criminal. Word count: 7,099
